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he retail payments system is certainly 
undergoing fundamental change.  It 
is dynamic, coming from a variety of 
sources, and it is significant. It also 
is no coincidence that nonbank firms are 
a significant part of this change and have 
become increasingly prevalent throughout 
the world’s payments system.  
In this context, the task for the central 
bankers—and  we  have  varying  degrees 
of  oversight  responsibility  for  the  retail 
payments  system  across  the  world—is  to 
understand  the  opportunities,  benefits 
and  costs  of  an  evolving  market-driven 
payments system, and then to balance the 
benefits  of  such  a  system  against  public 
goals of assuring a sound, stable and safe 
payments system globally.  
The Federal Reserve’s mission is to pro-
mote a payments system that is efficient, 
accessible and safe. I would start out my 
comments  by  saying,  as  a  general  point, 
nonbank  companies  have  had  a  positive 
influence in the areas of efficiency and ac-
cess around payments. By helping to intro-
duce new technologies and products, en-
tering new markets, and tapping into the 
economies of scale and scope, nonbanks are 
enhancing the efficiency in the payments 
system. By offering payments services that   
 
frequently transcend geo-
graphic  restrictions,  for 
example,  by  facilitating   
online payment options, 
nonbanks are enhancing, 
on  balance,  consumer 
access.
What  about  the 
impact  on  risk?  The 
growing  importance  of 
nonbank  firms  also  in-
troduces  new  sources 
of risk to the system and raises important 
questions  around  how  these  risks  would 
be managed in an ever-changing payments 
environment: the role of regulation versus 
self-regulation.  
Examples  of  recent  payments  system 
risk issues, which many people here have 
mentioned  already,  are  TJX  Company’s 
more than 45 million transaction records 
captured  away,  and  pharmacy  cards  that 
represented a means and an introduction   
to fraud.  
Certainly,  public  confidence  in  the 
ability of the payments system to manage 
new  risk  is  at  the  core  of  an  effective 
payments  system  over  time.  If  private 
incentives to manage risk are weak, or if 
they tend to fail under stress, then too often   
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1payments  crises  ensue.  And  the  central 
bank, or some public entity, must intervene 
at significant cost. That is what we wish   
to avoid.  
  With  that  in  mind,  I  would  like  to 
raise just three questions of how the central 
bank’s role might evolve as we move forward   
with payments.
•	 The	first	is	to	ask	about	the	adequacy	of	
oversight for nonbanks in terms of the 
regulatory environment;
•	 The	 second	 is	 the	 central	 bank’s	 role	
relative to the industry’s ability to self-
regulate,  which  is  important  and  has 
been mentioned;
•	 And	the	third	is	the	central	bank’s	role	as	  
a  participant  in  the  payments  system,   
which varies across the world but is an 
important question.
First,  is  the  current  supervisory  and 
regulatory  framework  adequate?  The 
problem is, as has been demonstrated here, 
we are mining the data now and we are 
still trying to gather enough information 
to  really  understand  where  we  ought  to 
be putting the regulatory elements of the 
evolving  payments  system.  Because  it  is 
changing so rapidly, we need to understand 
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system  disruptions.  Understanding  data 
breaches, how they are coming from their 
sources  and  how  they  are  evolving,  is 
important to us if we are going to begin to 
propose regulatory schemes.  
At  a  minimum,  we  should  do  more 
work in terms of assessing the effectiveness 
of our own regulatory framework for banks, 
and now for nonbanks, given the magnitude 
of the changes in the payments system since 
the framework was originally established.
  Some  of  the  following  factors  are 
important to consider:
•	 Nonbanks	have	increased	their	presence	
in  all  aspects  of  the  payments  system 
and are relied on by banks themselves as 
critical providers of processing.  
•	 Nonbank	firms	provide	certain	services	
and operate in a concentrated market, so 
operational disruptions in a single firm 
may  have  widespread  disruptions.  For 
example, nonbanks run two of the top 
three debit card networks in the United 
States.  The  third—Visa’s  InterLink, 
when  it  becomes  public—will  put  80 
percent	of	PIN	debit	transactions	in	the	
hands of those institutions.  
•	 Nonbanks	play	significant	roles	in	access	
and have a vast amount of consumer and 
business payments-related data that need 
to be protected and secured. In addition, 
the  Internet  provides  criminals  new 
avenues for stealing sensitive consumer 
data. I am sure we have all heard enough 
reports  of  transactions  that  have  been 
compromised to know how significant 
and important that is.
•	 Nonbank	firms	are	subject—and	this	is	
important—to  different,  and  certainly 
in  some  cases,  less  oversight  than  the 
banking firms in terms of the prudential 
supervision  that  takes  place  on-site.   
Retailers  and  other  nonbanks  are  not 
subject  to  the  Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act  and  its  requirements  to  protect 
customer payments data in the same way 
as banks. Instead, nonbanks are covered 
in our country under the Federal Trade 
Commission  safeguard  rule,  which,  in 
many cases, is an after-the-fact approach 
to taking care of these issues. We do have, 
in  terms  of  the  supervisory  oversight, 
some  access  to  payments  processors 
through  the  technology  services 
providers—if a bank is using an outside 
processor then the primary regulator can 
go in and check that provider to assess 
whether  they  are  following  prudential 
standards for processing and protecting 
that data.  That is far less oversight than 
the bank itself receives.
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While financial institutions’ supervisory 
agencies use a risk-based approach in their 
oversight of nonbank payments processors, 
there  remains  a  sizable  gap  in  coverage.   
For  example,  we  look  at  about  90  of 
these  nonbank  processors  and,  by  some 
measures,  there  are  literally  hundreds  of 
those operating that are not receiving the 
same kind of oversight that banks, or those 
subject to the technology services provider 
provisions, receive.
Accordingly,  while  we  need  to  be 
cautious about taking supervisory matters 
where  they  are  not  needed,  the  kinds  of 
questions  these  incidents  raise  warrant 
careful  consideration  as  we  consider 
evolving supervisory frameworks.  
When  I  say  that,  I  also  want  to 
acknowledge that further consideration does 
not necessarily mean imposing a bank-like 
supervisory  framework  over  the  nonbank 
industry.  The question that logically follows 
is whether, in the context of the changing 
risk profile of retail payments, the industry 
can  self-regulate.  Can  the  incentives  be 
aligned  properly  to  make  sure  we  don’t 
need a whole new set of regulations? How 
do  we  define  and  guide  regulations  so 
they are most effective? Where can we rely   
on incentives?
Certainly,  experience  has  shown  that 
with the right incentives, a market or an 
industry can attempt to self-regulate and, 
within certain boundaries, can be successful.   
Markets naturally resist outside constraints 
and that, in and of itself, encourages effective 
self-regulation.  This  pertains  not  just  to 
nonbanks  but  to  all  payment  providers.   
There are certainly examples of this.  
We have heard a lot of discussion here 
of PCI rules, which are credit card network 
data security standards, in relation to Visa.   
Central  banks  themselves  can  play  an 
important role in facilitating the industry’s 
efforts to promote safety and manage risk as 
well as promote efficiency.  Examples include 
rules	set	around	the	National	Automated	
Clearing	 House	 Association	 (NACHA).	 	
This conference itself is designed to increase 
the  information  and  perhaps  allow  the 
industry to find new ways or discover new 
incentives to self-regulate.
The  Federal  Reserve  also  is  involved 
in	some	of	the	ANSI	(American	National	
Standards  Institute,  which  coordinates 
a	 voluntary	 standardization	 system)	 rule	
writing.  Thus the effort to establish rules 
can be joint between the central bank and 
industry,  which  safeguards  and  protects 
the payments system and better assures it   
runs effectively.
Finally, in the context of past experience, 
I would raise the question of whether central 
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payments systems. Central banks have in 
the past and continue today to have a role 
in  the  broader  payments  system.  Central 
banks can enhance safety, as well as efficiency 
and access, by being a direct participant in 
the  payments  industry  where  it  serves  a 
purpose. Central banks around the world, 
for  example,  are  importantly  involved  in 
large-value wholesale transactions. Central 
banks are also involved in some elements of 
the retail payments system.  
The  Federal  Reserve,  of  course,  has 
a  role  in  the  checks  system  and  in  the 
automated	 clearinghouse	 (ACH)	 system,	
where it serves as one of two operators to 
provide  a  good  level  of  safety,  efficiency 
and  access  for  a  growing  number  of   
retail payments.  
Given  this  experience  and  the 
uncertainties of today’s global environment, 
questions are being raised regarding whether 
central  banks  might  also  participate  in 
electronic retail payments networks.  
Should, for example, the central bank 
operate an ACH network as a switch of last 
resort?  Could such a network accommodate 
other  electronic  payments,  such  as  credit 
and debit transactions, to clear settlement if 
there is a crisis? Would such a move inhibit 
or  encourage  competition  or  innovation, 
efficiency  and  access?  Would  it  provide 
for a better understanding of emerging yet 
unknown challenges, such as fraud issues, 
thereby  mitigating  risk  and  encouraging 
safety? Would it be available in the event of 
an economywide disruption such as 9/11?   
Such  questions,  I  agree,  are  difficult  but 
worth  thinking  about  while  we  have  the 
time to think about them and before we are 
forced in unfortunate circumstances to try 
to figure it out on the run.  
There is much to be said. I have enjoyed 
the last day and a half and have learned a 
great deal. We, as central banks, need to 
be thinking more about how the market 
is emerging; where, in those few instances 
when the market may fail, we have a role in 
regulating that market; and where central 
banks might have a direct role as well. 
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